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1 Introduction  
HIV/AIDS has emerged as a global epidemic of hitherto unknown repercussions. The most 
reliable statistics estimate that 40.3 million people world-wide were infected with HIV in De-
cember 2005 and that 3.1 million have died from AIDS-related diseases in the year 2005 
alone (UNAIDS & WHO 2005: 1). In correspondence to the magnitude of the epidemic, 
global initiatives have emerged to contain the spread of the disease and to mitigate its effects. 
HIV/AIDS thus can be seen as one of the triggers of Global Health Governance (GHG). At 
the same time, public health policies and its implementation are still generally perceived to be 
one of the state’s domaine réservées.  
Accordingly, this paper endeavours to analyse the relationship between GHG and national 
health governance in the case of HIV/AIDS. The interest is, first, to assess the impact of GHG 
on the national level and, second, in the other direction, the influence of national health gov-
ernance on GHG. This paper will compare Brazil and South Africa as two cases in which the 
relationship between national politics and GHG has been structured in contrasting ways, rang-
ing from conflict to cooperation. Different reciprocal influences will be analysed through the 
interface concept formulated by the GHG project group of the German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies (GIGA) (Hein, Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2006; Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2005; 
Hein & Kohlmorgen 2003). Interfaces are defined as “as socio-political spaces of recurrent 
interactions of collective actors in the handling of transnational and international affairs” 
(Hein, Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2006: 14). These forms of interaction can either take conflic-
tive or cooperative forms. A differentiation is made between four kinds of interfaces:  
1. “resource-transfer interfaces” denote the exchange of material and immaterial re-
sources. A typical example in the context of a developing country is the provision of 
development assistance by the World Bank or, bilaterally, by developed countries.  
2. “organisational interfaces” stand for formal and informal organisational forms of in-
teraction between different actors. These can be partnerships such as the Global Fund 
to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) or non-formalised means of coop-
eration.  
3. “legal interfaces” are defined by the implementation of judiciable norms and stan-
dards. Cases before national or international courts as well as formal contracts are the 
most common form of legal interfaces.  
4. “discursive interfaces”, finally, characterise the exchange of different ideas and values 
of actors from the global and the national level (Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2005: 3). 
2 
GHG actors interacting through the four interfaces are states, international organisations, pri-
vate business and civil society.  
The paired comparative analysis of this paper entails Brazil, a country where the relationship 
to GHG has been critical cooperative and South Africa, whose interaction with the global 
level has been conflictive.2 These different outcomes came about despite significant similari-
ties in the countries’ basic conditions. First, both Brazil and South Africa have major 
HIV/AIDS epidemics. According to Gauri & Lieberman, “important aspects of the epidemic 
followed a similar initial trajectory in both countries” (2004: 2). In the mid-1980s, a major 
HIV/AIDS crisis was predicted for both countries. However, Brazil has been able to keep the 
prevalence rate at 0.7% of the population (UNAIDS 2004: 202), whereas statistics for South 
Africa range from 10.4% to 11.8% (Doherty & Colvin 2004: 196). It is estimated that 660,000 
people in Brazil live with HIV; which contrasts with 5.3 million South Africans estimated to 
be infected by HIV (UNAIDS 2004: 190-191).3  
Second, besides the initial trajectory of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, both countries are middle-
income countries with comparable average incomes. Brazil had a gross national income (GNI) 
per capita of US$ 3,090 in 2004 and South Africa’s amounted to US$ 3,630 for the same year 
(World Bank 2005a: 292-293). The purchasing power parity in 2003 amounted to US$ 7,790 
for Brazil and US$ 10,346 for South Africa (UNDP 2005: 267-268). Additionally, both coun-
tries are plagued by a high degree of inequality, assessed through the Gini Index. In 2001, 
Brazil had a Gini Index of 59.34, which is comparable to South Africa’s value of 57.85 in 
2000 (UNDP 2005: 271-272). As a country’s average income tends to be highly correlated 
with the expenditure for fighting HIV/AIDS (Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 2-3), both govern-
ments could potentially revert to a similar resource base for fighting the disease. Furthermore, 
it can be expected that the basic relationship of Brazil and South Africa as middle-income 
countries to GHG is comparable, whereas it fundamentally differs from least developed coun-
tries and from industrialized countries of the “North”.  
Thus, on two fundamental context variables Brazil and South Africa exhibit commonalities, 
whereas they differ on the outcome, i.e. their relationship to GHG. The starkest differences in 
their fight against HIV/AIDS can be seen in respect to the antiretroviral (ARV) treatment of 
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 To our knowledge, Gauri and Lieberman (2004) have been the only scholars who have compared Brazil and 
South Africa in the field of HIV/AIDS policy. They, however, focused on the two countries’ response to the 
epidemic in general and not on the relationship between GHG and national health governance. Accordingly, the 
comparison in this paper aims at providing new insights on the political mechanisms related to GHG and the 
national level.  
3
 Note that due to methodological differences, the Brazilian and South African figures are not completely compa-
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4
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 Based on consumption.  
3 
HIV-infected people. The Brazilian government started to rollout ARVs free of charge in 
1996; whereas South Africa – reluctantly – only started in 2003, eight years later.6 This two-N 
comparison will thus provide insights on the influence of GHG on national HIV/AIDS gov-
ernance and vice versa.  
The qualitative comparison rests on a wide range of primary and secondary sources as its em-
pirical base. We conducted 48 interviews in South Africa and 68 in Brazil7, with respondents 
coming from governments, international organisations, the private business sector, civil soci-
ety organisations, the medical and the scientific sector. The analysis in this paper evolves 
along the four interface-types set out above, i.e. resource-transfer, organisational, legal and 
discursive. On the basis of the analysis along the four interface types the concluding chapter 
unravels the conflict and cooperation between national health governance and GHG in the 
fight of HIV/AIDS in Brazil and South Africa. 
 
 
2 Resource-transfer Interfaces: Different Degrees of Autonomy from the Global Level  
This study operationalises resource-transfer interfaces through external financial support for 
national health governance in the sphere of fighting HIV/AIDS. Resources can come from 
multilateral and bilateral donor agencies as well as from private foundations. They might di-
rect their funds to state organisations or to the civil society.  
In 1982, the year in which the first case of AIDS was made public in Brazil, the country also 
became heavily affected by the Latin American debt crisis (Baer & Paiva 1996: 67-8, 71; for 
an overview see Sangmeister 1992: 255-6).8 Only with a debt restructuring agreement and the 
issuing of federal bonds the severe financial crisis was resolved in 1994 (Calcagnotto 1985: 
63-74; Vazquez 1996: 5; Fritz 2002: 132-134; Tesouro Nacional 2006: 1-2). Thus, at least 
until the mid-1990s, Brazil had been reliant on resource-transfer interfaces for funding from 
the global level.  
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 The South African government has for a long time fiercely resisted the rolling-out of antiretrovirals (ARV) in 
public hospitals for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of the HI virus and for treating HIV-
infected people. Recent media reports suggest that despite the 2003 decision to provide ARVs the conflict over 
the treatment of HIV/AIDS in South Africa is not over. The number of patients on ARVs is far behind schedule 
and the Minister of Health does not distance herself from actors such as the Rath Foundation, which claim that 
ARVs are toxic (Mail & Guardian 2005a; Sunday Independent 2005). 
7
 Field work in South Africa was conducted from 2-25 May, 2005. Interviewers were Christian von Soest, Mar-
tin Weinel and Gero Erdmann. Gilberto Calcagnotto conducted field research in Brazil from 6 August to 29 
September, 2004 and 5-27 June, 2005.  
8
 According to Brazilian Central Bank, the middle- and long-term debt amounted in 1982 to US$ 83,3 billion 
(Central Bank 1983: 93). 
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Parallel to the general controversy about structural adjustment (Elmendorf & Roseberry 1993: 
123; Lurie et al. 1995: 539-546), the financial need for a reform of the Brazilian public health 
system had been unquestionable. The democratic Constitution of 1988 gave legal recognition 
to the principles of universal health care, decentralisation and popular participation as the 
fundamentals of the new Unified Health System (SUS – Sistema Único de Saúde). Accord-
ingly, in 1989 a tax-financed public health system (“Beveridge model”) replaced the former 
social insurance model. According to Mercadante, this institutional shift from a health system 
dimensioned for 90 million Brazilians to a new public health system “with current responsi-
bilities for 160 million people today cannot be done without significant new resources” (2002: 
275; see also: PAHO 2005: 27; Piola & Biasoto 2001: 219-220; Giovanella & Porto 2004: 11-
13). 
Since 1983 already, advocacy groups of homosexual men from São Paulo had fiercely fought 
for a response to HIV/AIDS following the same principles of universal access which charac-
terised the Unified Health System. In turn, São Paulo became the pioneer of an integrated 
concept of HIV/AIDS care and prevention as a matter of peoples’ right to health (Teixeira 
1997: 46). This strategy also formed the basis of the first Brazilian AIDS Programme which 
was established in 1985 (Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 18). However, although it would have 
conceptually been “a very proper vehicle for comprehensive management of HIV” (Berkman 
et al. 2005: 1166), the Unified Health System still being in its infancy could not cope with the 
quickly mounting HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
The universal provision of treatment against opportunistic diseases (since 1988), of the anti-
retroviral drug AZT (since 1991) and of the antiretroviral combination therapy HAART9 
(since 1996) free of charge through the national government (Galvão 2002: 214) had subse-
quently increased the gap between rapidly growing needs for treatment and Brazil’s scarce 
financial resources. Calculations from 1989 estimated the direct treatment costs for each 
AIDS patient to be approximately US$ 15,670 per year, with total costs forecasted to amount 
to around US$ 3.5 billion for the treatment of all known AIDS patients in Brazil (Medici 
1994: 328).10 Accordingly, external financing for the Brazilian Sexually Transmitted Dis-
eases/AIDS Programme (BSAP) had become a necessity in the beginning 1990s.  
In 1992, the Brazilian government was finally willing “to seek for” as the World Bank termed 
it (2005b: 11), or “to accept a financial help initiative offered as a long-term credit by the 
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 HAART stands for Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy, a combination of three different antiretroviral drugs 
to treat HIV/AIDS.  
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 According to Oliveira & Esher, from 1996 to 2002 the expenditures for purchasing ARV increased from US$ 
40 million to US$ 534 million, which was due to the rising number of HIV-infected people on treatment. This 
increase has more than compensated the progressively declining unit prices of ARV (2004: 243).  
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World Bank” (Galvão 2000: 140, emphasis by the authors). Since the conclusion of the loan 
agreement in 1994, it has been the multilateral institution that provides the highest external 
resource for the Brazilian health sector. Indeed, the World Bank has been “the earliest [exter-
nal donor] to become involved in a major way” (2005b: 26). Through the loans AIDS I (1994-
1998) and AIDS II (1998-2003) the institution made available credit facilities with a total of 
US$ 325 million for prevention activities, epidemiological surveillance and capacity building. 
The Brazilian government’s own contribution to the projects has been US$ 225 million. The 
third programme, AIDS III (2003-2006), has a total volume of US$ 200 million, with 50% 
financed by each partner respectively (World Bank 2004: 7-9; World Bank 2005b: 14-15, 20-
21, 25) The financial contribution of other external donors has not gone beyond 10% of over-
all external resources (US$ 278 million for 1992-1997) (Fontes 1999: 96-7). 
Resource-transfer interfaces have also been strongly used by NGOs working in the field of 
HIV/AIDS. Before the World Bank started to provide funds to NGOs in 1994, financing from 
private foundations such as the Ford Foundation had been of “fundamental” importance for 
the pioneer NGOs ABIA, GAPA, and Pela VIDDA11 (Galvão 2000: 134). Today, their main 
revenue sources are internal as well as external. In a recent survey of 328 HIV/AIDS civil 
society organisations, the greatest group stated to receive funds through “agreements with 
public bodies” (78%) and “donation by individuals” (72.6%). However, 40.9% also draw on 
support from an “international cooperation agency” (Castro & Silva 2005: 157). 
In conclusion, Brazil has extensively used resource-transfer interfaces in relating to GHG. 
Since the World Bank loans were issued in 1993, the Brazilian Sexually Transmitted Dis-
eases/AIDS Programme (BSAP) to a large extent has been funded by external sources. Fur-
thermore, the civil society organisations working on HIV/AIDS have also drawn on revenue 
sources from the global level.  
In contrast, South Africa’s fight against HIV/AIDS was hardly directly influenced via finan-
cial contributions from the global level – that is resource-transfer interfaces. According to 
Schneider & Gilson (1999: 266) total international aid to the health sector had just been over 
1% of the South African annual government health budget in the period 1994 until 1999 and 
did not rise thereafter. As a middle-income country which has not been severely indebted12, 
South Africa has not been reliant on conditional donor aid.13 Neither the Apartheid govern-
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 GAPA is the abbreviation for Grupo de Apoio à Prevenção à AIDS (AIDS-Prevention Promotion Group); 
Grupo Pela VIDDA stands for Grupo Pela Valorização, Integração e Dignidade do Doente de Aids (Group for 
Appreciation, Integration and Dignity of AIDS Patients).  
12
 In 1996, shortly after the democratic transition, South Africa’s total external debt amounted to US$ 23.6 bil-
lion (World Bank 1998: 249).  
13
 Accordingly, this position stands in clear contrast to Brazil.  
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ment nor, since the democratic transformation in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) 
government have extensively drawn on external resources for financing public health poli-
cies.14 In correspondence to its favourable financial position, the ANC-government thus has 
refused offers of financial or technical aid which it found not fitting into its policy framework, 
“particularly from the World Bank” (Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 28) and particularly in respect 
to the controversial question of HIV/AIDS treatment.  
This approach became obvious when in 2002 the ANC-government blocked the disbursement 
of US$ 72 million which the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM) had awarded to the Enhancing Care Initiative (ECI) of the province KwaZulu-
Natal. Its HIV/AIDS programme inter alia included antiretroviral schemes to reduce the risk 
of mother-child-transmission (MTCT) of the virus and to provide antiretroviral treatment to 
infected persons (Pawinski & Lalloo 2002). Despite the fact that the South African National 
AIDS Council (SANAC) had not been functioning at that time, the Minister of Health argued 
that only the national government level could apply to the Global Fund (Weinel 2005: 45). 
Only in March 2004, the approved funds were – through the national government – trans-
ferred to KwaZulu-Natal’s Enhancing Care Initiative (information given by a respondent in-
terviewed for this study).15  
Inflows of foreign aid were only accepted in 2004 also, with the US-American President’s 
Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) providing US$ 89.4 million during the year and 
US$ 132.1 million in 2005 for treatment, prevention, care of orphans and palliative care 
(United States Global AIDS Coordinator 2005: 115).16 As stated by the US embassy in South 
Africa, 60% of the funds have been allocated to the South African government and 40% to 
civil society organisations working in the field of HIV/AIDS (United States 2006). However, 
the influence on South Africa’s HIV/AIDS policy is perceived to be low as the ANC-
government integrates PEPFAR funds according to its strategies already in place. The funds 
thus cover parts of government programmes (Interview Ramlagan, 11.05.2005). 
A lot of South African civil society actors have been partly or fully funded by external actors 
such as aid agencies, international organisations or private foundations. Recipients have been 
for instance the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the Health System Trust, the AIDS 
Foundation or the research institute IDASA. Most prominent has been the TAC, which since 
its foundation in December 1998, has quickly emerged as the most vocal civil society actor in 
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 Due to an international embargo, the opportunities for the Apartheid government to draw on external funds 
had been limited in any event.  
15
 The name of the respondent was made anonymous. 
16
 According to the US embassy in South Africa, the funds allocated in the year 2005 have amounted to US$ 148 
million (United States 2006). 
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the sphere of South Africa’s HIV/AIDS policy.17 Almost the total of the organisation’s R23.5 
million budget for the financial year ending in February 2005 came from foreign donors. The 
sources among others were Bread for the World, the Open Society Foundation, the Swedish 
International Development Agency, Oxfam and the Ford Foundation. Only one donator, the 
AIDS Foundation of South Africa is based in the country (TAC 2005).18 Less obvious has 
been the resource-transfer from international organisations. Despite the fact that the TAC lists 
UNAIDS as one of their donors, it remains unclear how much resources UNAIDS has indeed 
provided to TAC and for what activities (Mbali 2005: 38). Furthermore, despite the fact that 
TAC as well as respondents from international organisations interviewed for this study re-
ported regular interaction, the status of UNAIDS, WHO, GFATM as international organisa-
tions prevented them from openly criticising the South African government and aligning with 
TAC or other civil society actors.19  
Direct resource-transfers to South Africa’s HIV/AIDS programme have been low. The prime 
reason has been the ANC-government’s resilience to preserve its national sovereignty. The 
status as a middle-income country with insignificant external debt has allowed the govern-
ment to refuse external aid. There has been, however, strong interaction through resource-
transfer interfaces between South Africa’s NGOs and the global level. In respect to these ac-
tors, the influence of GHG on national health governance can be perceived to be strong.  
 
 
3 Organisational Interfaces: Important Indicator for Conflict and Cooperation  
In this study, organisational interfaces are defined as entities, which are formed by at least two 
consenting actors from GHG and national health governance. The use of organisational inter-
faces therefore acts as a crucial indicator for the degree of cooperation between the national 
and the global level.  
Since 1980, the World Health Organization (WHO), through its regional representative Pan 
American Health Organisation (PAHO), has developed multiple initiatives with Brazilian 
health authorities and academic institutions. These joint activities by means of organisational 
interfaces laid the conceptual basis for the reform of Brazilian health system in the 1980s and 
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 Some commentators even describe the TAC as “one of South Africa’s most effective and active” groups in the 
whole NGO sector (Mail & Guardian 2003; see also Willan 2004: 114). 
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 The full list of donors along with a detailed analysis can be found in Mbali (2005: 22-23). 
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 GFATM’s 2002 decision to grant US$ 72 million to KwaZulu-Natal’s HIV/AIDS programme, which also 
entailed funds for ARV treatment, can be understood as an implicit support for an antiretroviral treatment strat-
egy against HIV/AIDS in South Africa (see below and also Weinel 2005: 45).  
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1990s. As outlined above, this in turn shaped the Brazilian Sexually Transmitted Dis-
eases/AIDS Programme (BSAP) (Lima 2002: 92-93; Fontes 1999: 113-114).  
The UNAIDS Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, established in Brazil in 1997, has coordinated the 
activities of international organisations in the country. It includes various UN organisations, 
the World Bank, bilateral donor organisations, the BSAP and the Foreign Ministry, as well as 
two representatives from civil society (UNAIDS 2001: 3). Since 2004, several other federal 
ministries have also used this organisational interface (Interview Herlt, 13.9.2004). According 
to the former Director of BSAP, Paulo Teixeira, the UNAIDS Theme Group in Brazil has 
brought “positive synergic effects” at federal, state and municipal levels (Interview Teixeira, 
24.8.2004). It has actively participated in the organisation of the Brazilian HIV/AIDS preven-
tion campaign, for instance through motivating local mayors to actively participate and inform 
their communities on the epidemic (Interview Milhomem, 15.9.2004). However, UNAIDS’ 
interaction with the WHO and World Bank has been rather formal than effective and the ex-
change with other national institutions working on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment has 
almost been non-existent. Accordingly, UNAIDS and WHO have rarely exerted a direct in-
fluence on the formulation of the Brazilian HIV/AIDS policy (Interviews Teixeira, 24.8.2004; 
Bonifácio, 14.9.2004).  
Conversely, Brazilian actors effectively used organisational interfaces to influence GHG. In 
2004, Brazil’s representative was unanimously elected Vice-President of the UNAIDS Pro-
gramme Coordinating Board and in 2005 he assumed the Presidency of the body (CNAIDS 
2004). This increased impact on the global level exemplifies the government’s general policy 
of actively working on HIV/AIDS within international organisations. There have also been 
evidences for Brazil’s civil society exerting influence on GHG. For instance, the 1986-
founded Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS-Association (ABIA) was actively involved in the 
fifth International AIDS Conference in Montreal in 1989 (Galvão 2000: 87). On that occasion, 
the International Council of AIDS Service Organisations (ICASO) was established with the 
main aim to strengthen the global response of civil society organisations. Acting as the 
ICASO Secretariat for Latin America, ABIA also spearheaded the creation of the Latin 
American and Caribbean Council of AIDS Service Organizations (LACCASO) as a further 
organisational interface (Galvão 2000: 87).20 
In the context of organisational interfaces, the active participation of NGOs and the Brazilian 
government on GHG appears to have been of more importance than the direct influence of 
multilateral organisations, such as UNAIDS, onto Brazil’s national health governance. 
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 In Galvão (2000), further examples of Brazilian NGOs entering into organisational interfaces can be found.  
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WHO’s influence through organisational interfaces, for example, has been important for the 
fundamental reform of the Brazilian Unified Health System but less for the fight against 
HIV/AIDS specifically. 
In contrast, the South African government rarely entered into organisational interfaces, indi-
cating a high degree of conflict with the GHG level, particularly in respect to antiretroviral 
treatment of AIDS. One important organisational interface between the global and the na-
tional level has been LoveLife, an organisation working in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention. 
The public-private partnership has been co-financed by the US-based Kaiser Family Founda-
tion and other donors as well as the South African government, which provides 34% of the 
overall budget. Furthermore, LoveLife receives substantial resources from the Global Fund.21 
The organisation’s annual budget for 2005 has been around R200 million (Interview 
O’Connor, 11.05.2005; Mail & Guardian 2005b). Running South Africa’s biggest HIV/AIDS 
prevention programme for teenagers, it designs accessible and youth friendly clinics, advertis-
ing campaigns, and sponsors various events (Interview O’Connor, 11.05.2005). LoveLife en-
joys a cordial and collaborative relationship with the government and even has the Minister of 
Health on its Advisory Board. In short, it acts as a “government service-provider” (Mbali 
2005: 18).  
Furthermore, there is some evidence that experts from the William J. Clinton Foundation 
were involved in the Joint Health and Treasury Task Team (JHTTT), which was set up to in-
vestigate the feasibility and the costs of universal access to treatment of HIV/AIDS in South 
Africa in 2002 (Ijumba et al. 2004: 333). The US foundation was thus linked to the national 
level through an organisational interface. However, it remains unclear how far-reaching the 
technical support and the practical influence of the Clinton Foundation’s experts on South 
Africa’s “Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Care, Management and Treatment 
for South Africa” (Government Communication and Information Service 2003) in fact had 
been. Although the Clinton Foundation was – on the global level – very influential in reduc-
ing prices for antiretroviral drugs, their experts were later denied further access to South Afri-
can institutions with the government stopping any further cooperation with the foundation 
(information given by a respondent interviewed for this study).22  
A prominent organisational interface which global actors required for accessing their funds 
has been the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC). Although the Partnership a-
gainst HIV/AIDS, introduced by the then Deputy President Mbeki in October 1998, could be 
interpreted as a move towards a broad-based response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, SANAC, 
                                                
21
 It thus also is an example for the resource-transfer interface.  
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 The name of the respondent was made anonymous. 
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founded in January 2000, was the first South African institution that embodied the idea of a 
“multisectoral response”23 (Strode & Barrett Grant 2004: 14). Shortly after its inception, the 
Multi-country AIDS Programme (MAP) of the World Bank, launched in September 2000, 
requested countries to formulate a “coherent national, multisectoral strategy and action plan” 
and to apply for grants through “a high-level HIV/AIDS coordinating body – that is a national 
AIDS commission or council” (Putzel 2004: 1131-1132.  
South Africa did not participate in MAP, but aimed at applying for Global Fund grants. The 
government even sent the Vice-Minister of Health as a representative to the Board of the or-
ganisation. Similarly, the Global Fund, created in 2002, made a particular organisational 
structure, the “Country Coordinating Mechanism” an institutional necessity for the disburse-
ment of its funds. As shown in the discussion of the Enhancing Care Initiative in KwaZulu-
Natal, SANAC, the South African version of the coordinating body, started functioning only 
in early 2002. An obvious interpretation is that SANAC has first and foremost acted as the 
required “Country Coordinating Mechanism” in order to access resources from the Global 
Fund, while it has not fulfilled its functions prescribed in the 2000-2005 Strategic Plan.24 
Thus, in this case, resource-transfer considerations induced the South African government to 
form an institution along a globally prescribed “organisational template” (Putzel 2004: 1130).  
On the whole, the South African government rarely entered into organisations with interna-
tional actors in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Examples found have worked on HIV/AIDS pre-
vention, with LoveLife being the most prominent organisation. The short cooperation episode 
with the Clinton Foundation strongly confirms the government’s stance to preserve its auton-
omy. In the face of South Africa’s treatment controversy, the government has not been willing 
to accept external influences through organisational interfaces.  
 
 
4 Legal Interfaces: Disputes with Repercussions for the Global Level  
Legal interfaces are one of the main means broadening or narrowing the access to the public 
health system. Therefore, the legal recognition of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution to universal 
access to health as “a right of all and a duty of the State” (Republic of Brazil 1988, Art. 196 
in: Senado Federal 2003: 119) had acted as an immovable pillar for the negotiations about the 
World Bank credits AIDS I-III (Parker et al. 2001: 110). On the global level, Brazil’s fight for 
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 A “multisectoral” approach in fighting HIV/AIDS entails the involvement of all branches of government and 
cooperation with non-governmental actors (World Bank 1999: 22-23; Putzel 2004: 1134-1135). 
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 The regulative base of SANAC is laid down in the Strategic AIDS Plan 2000-2005 (Department of Health 
2000: 12-14), which was developed during the second half of 1999.  
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a human right to access antiretroviral treatment was indirectly recognised by the April 2001 
Resolution of the UN Commission on Human Rights dealing with the “Access to medication 
in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.” The resolution was passed by a 52-0 vote 
with only one abstention (Wogart & Calcagnotto 2006: 96; Galvão 2002: 219). One month 
later, the WHO World Assembly, following a Brazilian proposal, also confirmed “the right to 
health and that the progressive realisation of that right in the context of HIV/AIDS involves 
access to treatment” (ISHR 2001).  
However, coming to GHG influencing national health governance, Brazil has for a long time 
fought with the United States over pharmaceutical patent rights. PhRMA, the association of 
the US pharmaceutical industry, had started to lobby against the Brazilian patent law, which 
excluded medical products from patent protection, already in 1988 (Marques 2002: 43, Tachi-
nardi 1993: 67). Only following severe commercial sanctions through punitive customs duties 
on selected Brazilian export products25, applied in 1990 (Silva 2005: 131), the Brazilian gov-
ernment consented to formulate a patent law which included the protection of pharmaceutical 
products. However, the new Brazilian patent law, issued in 1996, still limited the scope of 
pharmaceutical patent rights. Paragraph 68 forced pharmaceutical MNCs to locally produce 
their drugs within three years of patent approval – a provision whose non-compliance allowed 
the government to issue compulsory licences.26 The United States filed a complaint on this 
Paragraph with the WTO in 2001 (Galvão 2002: 216; Marques 2002: 44, 46).  
The dispute, fought through legal interfaces, only came to end when Brazil restricted the pos-
sibility of compulsory licensing to cases of a national health emergency. In consequence, the 
United States on June 25, 2001, withdrew its formal complaint against Brazil before the 
WTO. Brazil in turn agreed to notify the US government in advance if it found it necessary to 
issue a compulsory license. This solution came also as a result of open pressure from NGOs, 
simultaneously articulated through discursive interfaces in the US and Brazil (Cepaluni 2005: 
80-81; Ashraf 2001: 2112; Galvão 2002: 215-6; Wogart & Calcagnotto 2006: 95-96). 
Since 1997, a Brazilian state laboratory (Far-Manguinhos in Rio de Janeiro) has developed 
the technology for the production of several ARV combinations which consisted of drugs 
non-protected and of drugs protected by patent laws (Oliveira & Esher 2004: 244; Cassier & 
Correa 2003: 90-91; Marques 2002: 69). For the latter, the pharmaceutical MNCs as patent 
holders were allowed to and indeed did charge monopoly prices. As a consequence, the Bra-
zilian authorities in the early 2000s had negotiated with a number of pharmaceutical MNCs in 
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 “Compulsory licensing is generally defined as the granting of a license to a third-party by a government to use 
a patent without the permission of the patent holder” (Kühl 2002: 17). 
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order to obtain cheaper prices for the ARV cocktail (Oliveira & Esher 2004: 244-245; Wogart 
& Calcagnotto 2006: 96). Following unsuccessful negotiations, the Brazilian Health Minister 
in August 2001 announced that his government would issue a compulsory license for the pro-
duction of Roche’s antiretroviral drug Nelfinavir (sold under the brand name Viracept) to a 
Brazilian manufacturer. Responding to the threat, Roche resumed the negotiations and agreed 
to lower its prices by 40% (Roche 2001). The threat of issuing compulsory licenses for ge-
neric drugs brought substantial price cuts for other antiretroviral drugs as well (Cohen & Ly-
becker 2005: 218-220).27  
Along this “Brazilian path”, the government has used legal interfaces in different ways: Its 
strategies have ranged from open conflict to pragmatic negotiations with pharmaceutical 
MNCs. After the negotiations’ collapse, the government overtly threatened to use the legal 
provisions for compulsory licensing. There thus have been numerous empirical evidences 
emanating from the Brazilian case that legal interfaces are a particularly strong weapon to 
enhance public health interests both at the global and the national level.  
In the South African case, legal interfaces, used by global and national actors, have also been 
important forms of interaction with repercussions for GHG. South Africa came in the interna-
tional limelight when in February 1998 the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa (PMA), backed by the American PhRMA, sued the South African government 
for violating their property rights before South Africa’s High Court.28 The lawsuit, which was 
based on the legal provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, was supported by the United States 
government, which threatened to impose trade restrictions on South Africa (Lanoszka 2003: 
191-192). 
It aimed at the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, signed by Presi-
dent Mandela in December 1997, which gave the South African Minister of Health the power 
to allow both compulsory licensing and parallel importation29 of patented medicines, in this 
case particularly antiretroviral drugs (Kühl 2002: 76). Responding to intense national and in-
ternational public pressure and with only slim chances to win the case, the 39 pharmaceutical 
MNCs represented by the PMA backtracked from the case in late 1998 (Weissman 2001).  
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 The domestic production of the drugs Nevirapine and Indinavir in 2000 represented savings of US$ 80 mil-
lion, or 30% of the overall ARV-expenditures in that year (Marques 2002: 69). As a consequence of price reduc-
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& Esher 2004: 245).  
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 See particularly paragraph 2.4 of the complaint with the High Court (PMA 1998). Extensive documentation of 
the case can be found on the web page of the American NGO CPtech (http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/). 
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 “Parallel importation refers to the imports of goods purchased in a foreign market by an independent third 
party and later resold in the domestic market where much lower prices compete with the prices charged by au-
thorized distributors” (Kühl 2002: 18). 
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However, in January 2001 the lawsuit was reinstated. The chances for a victory of the phar-
maceutical manufacturers were considerably better because South Africa was now obliged to 
fully comply with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement (Kühl 2002: 76). The pharma-
ceutical MNCs maintained that the case was not directed against South Africa’s efforts to 
seek price reductions for antiretroviral medicine. That, however, was exactly the impression 
that AIDS activists and NGOs in South Africa and around the world tried to create. Interna-
tionally recognised NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, CPtech or ACT-UP 
pressured the pharmaceutical MNCs to withdraw the case. Even the Bush administration now 
refrained from openly supporting the pharmaceutical industry (Weissman 2001). Demonstra-
tions were organised in South Africa, but also in front of several pharmaceutical MNCs’ 
headquarters in Europe and North America.  
The pharmaceutical industry, fearing another public relations nightmare, finally withdrew the 
lawsuit in mid-April 2001 (Lanoszka 2003: 192) and agreed to “a settlement almost on the 
government of South Africa’s terms. The only concession made by the government was to 
comply with decisions made by the World Trade Organizations on TRIPS” (Kühl 2002: 78).  
Therefore, the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act from 1997 re-
mained largely unchanged. In conjunction with strong public pressure from discursive inter-
faces used, the legal challenge was averted. However, the government rejected proposals from 
civil society to declare the HIV/AIDS epidemic a national emergency.30 The Doha Declara-
tion explicitly permits countries to issue compulsory licences in case of national health emer-
gencies (Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 26).  
On balance, legal interfaces, through the High Court case, have been an important route for 
interaction of South African actors and the global level. It strengthened the South African 
government’s case of blaming pharmaceutical MNCs and augmented the international pres-
sure to reduce the prices for antiretroviral drugs. The legal interfaces are the means of interac-
tion in which the strategies of the Brazilian and the South African governments have shown 
the biggest similarity. Both governments have fought against pharmaceutical MNCs being 
responsible for high ARV-prices. According to Gauri and Lieberman, both countries “have 
styled themselves as emboldened leaders of the developing countries in this regard” (2004: 
27). 
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 In fact, the obvious contradiction between the South African government claiming that antiretrovirals are too 
expensive and not using its legal provisions to lower the prices remains puzzling. One common explanation 
given from respondents in South Africa has been that the ANC-government does not perceive the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic to be a national emergency. One MP from the ruling party and member of SANAC maintained that 
“we are not running in a crisis mode.” 
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5 Discursive Interfaces: Strong Interaction between National and Global Level  
The loan negotiations between Brazil and the World Bank (see resource-transfer interfaces) 
took place amidst a dispute, expressed through discursive interfaces, of the Brazilian govern-
ment focussing on its comprehensive and human rights-based approach to fight HIV/AIDS on 
the one hand and the World Bank with its prevention concept on the other hand. The role of 
NGOs in the negotiations helped to restrict the World Bank’s influence to an almost exclu-
sively resource-transfer character. In fact, as Parker et al. remark,  
Brazil’s experience in fighting AIDS did not orient itself accordingly to the ideas the Bank of-
fered. On the contrary, Brazilian government developed the experience to guarantee universal 
access of AIDS patients to ARV, and this experience – because of its innovative characteris-
tics – has been discussed and taken as an example for other countries (2001: 110).  
 
For the World Bank, drug distribution without charging patients has not constituted a policy 
to be recommended, since the institution focussed on the cost effectiveness of public health 
programmes (1997: 3). Nevertheless, these differences on the discursive level did not impede 
the concession of the AIDS I-III loans, because both sides “agreed to disagree” (World Bank 
2005b: 13). Brazil’s comprehensive approach could be implemented, whereas the World Bank 
invested in improving the cost effectiveness of HIV/AIDS prevention, surveillance and in 
building public health institutions. The disagreement on discursive aspects did thus not pre-
vent an agreement about financial cooperation. 
HIV/AIDS workplace programmes may also be considered to influence through discursive 
interfaces, since they raise awareness for the epidemic, inform about prevention and demon-
strate the effectiveness of ARV treatment. In Brazil, workplace programmes for prevention 
and awareness have been implemented since 1985, with large national and multinational 
companies taking the lead. Bank conglomerates (e.g. Itaú since 1987), state owned companies 
(e.g. the power utility Furnas since 1992) and MNCs such as Ford have implemented 
HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention programmes from early on (Terto 1997: 142, 152; 
Teixeira 1997: 60-61). NGOs such as ABIA and GAPA as well as immunology centres, 
which never had any direct contact to the business sector before, have provided technical in-
put to companies’ HIV/AIDS workplace programmes (Terto 1997: 152).31  
Established in 1998, the Brazilian National Business AIDS Council (CEN) has been the body 
representing business at the Brazilian Sexually Transmitted Diseases/AIDS Programme 
(BSAP). It furthermore has exerted an important global diffusion function in disseminating 
best practices in respect to workplace programmes (Terto 1997: 154). The result of these do-
                                                
31
 This also acts as an example for organisational interfaces.  
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mestic and multilateral activities has been a change in mentality. Firms and private founda-
tions began to view NGOs and trade unions as potential partners in fighting HIV/AIDS. One 
scholar even speaks of a “new social philanthropy” on the part of the business sector (Terto 
1997: 152). However, quantitatively the picture is less encouraging: According to a 2006 
World Economic Forum survey, only 43% of 212 Brazilian business leaders interviewed de-
clared that their company runs a workplace HIV/AIDS programme (BBC Brazil 2006). 
In sum, the position of the BSAP focussing on comprehensively fighting HIV/AIDS, i.e. inte-
grating prevention, care and treatment, has originated as a result of domestic pressure from 
civil society organisations. Apart from the question of antiretroviral drug pricing, the interac-
tion between Brazil’s national health governance and GHG through discursive interfaces has 
been critical cooperative.32 The HIV/AIDS workplace programmes have exemplary shown the 
consensual use of discursive interfaces between multinational and national businesses as well 
as NGOs in fighting HIV/AIDS in Brazil.  
In South Africa, discursive interfaces have been characterised by conflicts between the South 
African government and global as well as other national health governance actors. Global 
actors operating in the country have, however, increasingly been successful in shaping dis-
courses on HIV/AIDS and on antiretroviral treatment in particular. Contradicting government 
positions, they were able to demonstrate that antiretroviral treatment of HIV/AIDS is an effec-
tive and feasible option for the country.  
One of the most prominent HIV/AIDS antiretroviral projects emerged in the Western Cape, 
the only province which, besides KwaZulu-Natal, had not been governed by the ANC until 
2004. In January 1999, the Nobel Peace Prize winning NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
started – with the support of the Western Cape provincial government – an ARV-based pro-
gramme to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) in Khayelitsha, a large 
township close to Cape Town (Médecins Sans Frontières 2003: 14). In May 2001, the organi-
sation established the first public sector service to provide antiretroviral treatment to people 
living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Although the national government disapproved this 
development, the political constellation in the Western Cape province permitted the engage-
ment of MSF. The Khayelitsha project set a publicly visible example that antiretrovirals can 
be successfully administered even in a resource-poor setting of a township. This is reflected in 
a report of the TAC – a close ally of MSF – from 2003:  
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 As shown above, that did not preclude different positions of Brazil’s government and the World Bank on the 
implementation of Brazil’s strategy against HIV/AIDS.  
16 
The Western Cape is strategically important to TAC because it is here that the potential for 
good examples on treatment are most likely to be set for the rest of the country at a primary 
health-care level (Treatment Action Campaign 2003: 3).  
 
The media have also used the Khayelitsha project to push the government on the provision of 
drugs in order to lower the risk of MTCT, with headlines like “It’s so easy to save our AIDS 
babies” (Sunday Times 2000) or “Ray of light for HIV moms” (Sunday Times 1999). 
Generally, the NGO sector strongly interacted through discursive interfaces. The TAC most 
actively forged networks with international non-governmental organisations (INGOS) and 
international organisations which have had significant impacts on GHG.33 In cooperation with 
its partners, TAC organised the international protests supporting South Africa’s government 
in the court case of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association challenging the Medicines 
and Related Substances Amendment Act (Gumede 2005: 157, see also above). INGOs later 
also conducted solidarity protests during TAC’s civil disobedience campaign against the gov-
ernment, which included demonstrations in front of South African embassies around the 
world (Mbali 2005: 36). In its campaign tactics, TAC has learnt from the US-based NGO 
AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) (Schneider 2001: 18). This gives further evi-
dence to the strong interaction of NGO actors from the national and the global level through 
discursive interfaces. 
In contrast, scholars have described the reaction of MNCs which operate in South Africa to-
wards the HIV/AIDS epidemic as reluctant and weak (Dickinson 2004: 628; Connely & 
Rosen 2005: 1925). No coordinated and explicit initiative emerged to influence the fight 
against HIV/AIDS. However, there have been strong indications that concern was expressed 
behind closed doors. Important in this regard has been the President’s International Invest-
ment Council, consisting of 15 business leaders from all over the world. According to various 
respondents from international organisations and business interviewed for this study, in 
March 2002 members of the body warned President Mbeki about the HIV/AIDS treatment 
controversy’s possible implications for foreign direct investment to South Africa (Gumede 
2005: 171). The weekly newsletter ANC Today, published after the International Investment 
Council meeting, acknowledged that “the members of Council had raised serious concerns 
about some persisting negative perceptions of our country internationally” (ANC 2002). This 
gave a new resource-transfer dimension to the discursive contest around South Africa’s 
HIV/AIDS policy: it affected the country’s attractiveness as a place for foreign business.  
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More public resonance found the workplace programmes of large, often multinational, busi-
ness in South Africa which have provided antiretroviral treatment to their workers and their 
families. Businesses’ commitment to workplace programmes has been contested in the litera-
ture. Dickinson for instance argues, that most companies started to move towards the provi-
sion of antiretrovirals to their workers not earlier than 2002, when the government already 
began to change its stance on HIV/AIDS treatment (2004: 627, 631). Connely & Rosen esti-
mate that only between 5,000 and 30,000 South African workers (and in some cases members 
of their families) received ART in the beginning of 2005 (2005: 1925). Without entering into 
the discussion whether businesses’ reaction has been adequate to the magnitude of the 
HIV/AIDS problem in South Africa, it can be safely said that the highly publicised workplace 
programmes of the mining company Anglo-American, the parastatal power utility Eskom and 
the – multinational – car manufacturers DaimlerChrysler, BMW and Volkswagen had a dem-
onstration effect on South Africa’s HIV/AIDS policy via discursive interfaces.34  
In sum, discursive interfaces have been the strongest route of interaction between the South 
African and the global level. MSF’s Khayelitsha project and (multinational) businesses’ 
workplace programmes set a forceful and publicly visible precedent of effectively administer-
ing antiretroviral therapy. The concerns raised by MNC leaders point to economic conse-
quences as a forceful factor amplifying discursive interfaces. Conversely, civil society actors 
such as the TAC successfully influenced the global level and created an international aware-
ness for the HIV/AIDS treatment controversy in South Africa.  
 
 
6 Conclusion  
The fight against HIV/AIDS has been an area of strong national health governance and GHG 
interaction. Both South African and Brazilian actors have interacted continuously with the 
global level through different interfaces. The ways of interaction have, however, been diamet-
rically opposed with the starkest differences in respect to resource-transfer interfaces. Brazil 
has, through three World Bank loans, received a total of US$ 425 million for its National 
AIDS Programme, whereas South Africa has refused international assistance apart from 
Global Fund resources for its prevention programme. Only in 2004, the South African gov-
ernment accepted funds for the province KwaZulu-Natal’s HIV/AIDS programme, which also 
entailed an antiretroviral treatment component. This contrasting receptivity for funds from the 
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global level exemplifies the conflicting relationship with GHG on the part of South Africa and 
Brazil’s cooperative approach.35  
This analysis has clearly shown that the influence of GHG on national health governance has 
been mediated by the national political context. In other words, national politics and actor 
constellations account for most of the contrasts between Brazil and South Africa’s fight on 
HIV/AIDS. This concurs with Gauri and Lieberman who state that “differences in foreign 
assistance on HIV/AIDS can be explained from the perspective of domestic policy choices” 
(2004: 27, see also Gould 2005: 2). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain both countries’ domestic policy processes but 
other research suggests that the decentralised nature of Brazil’s political system, the more 
dispersed party landscape and – particularly – its coherent “national political community” 
incorporating all ethnicities explains much of the country’s more aggressive and coherent 
fight against HIV/AIDS compared to South Africa (e.g. Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 30-32). In 
contrast, South Africa’s HIV/AIDS policy has for a long time been dominated by the central 
ANC-government which could push through its strict refusal to provide ARVs in the public 
health system. Accordingly the South African government had no interest in cooperation with 
GHG actors over the question of HIV/AIDS treatment and rarely entered into organisational 
or resource-transfer interfaces. As the dominating political actor on that national level the 
ANC-government severely diminished the scope for GHG influence.  
Because of the conflictive relationship with GHG, discursive interfaces – with multinational 
NGOs and businesses for example successfully administering highly visible antiretroviral 
treatment programmes – became the main routes of influence in South Africa. Conversely, 
and somewhat paradoxically, the influence of discursive interfaces on Brazil’s fight against 
HIV/AIDS has been lower, despite funding from the World Bank which pursued another pol-
icy. As the analysis has shown, the Bank has not been able to push through its model of how 
to fight HIV/AIDS. Brazil has refused to charge HIV-infected people for ARV treatment and 
created a much acclaimed multidimensional range of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment 
activities which became known as the “Brazilian model” (Parker 2003: 144). The main reason 
has been the consent that had emerged on the adequate fight against HIV/AIDS among Brazil-
ian actors from the state, civil society and business.  
The analysis points to the fact that the relationship between the different interfaces is highly 
context-specific. On the one hand, the World Bank example has shown that interfaces can 
work incongruently, i.e. that accordance between national health governance and GHG actors 
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is found in respect to one interface but not in respect to an other. In Brazil’s case, the re-
source-transfer interface was used but GHG-influence through discursive interfaces was lim-
ited. On the other hand, interfaces can work in congruence with one another. For instance, 
resource-transfer implications clearly stood at the basis of the South African government’s 
decision to mould the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) along the “organisa-
tional template” (Putzel 2004: 1130) of a country-coordinating mechanism required by the 
Global Fund.  
Not only had GHG (some) influence on national health governance, but the national experi-
ences and politics of Brazil and South Africa also exerted an important impact on GHG. In 
this direction, discursive interfaces also proved to be of crucial significance. As outlined 
above, Brazil has acted as a global role model for the fight against HIV/AIDS, with “perhaps 
the most successful experience yet realized in any developing country, but perhaps anywhere” 
(Parker 2003: 144). Furthermore, Brazilian as well as South African actors have consistently, 
through discursive interfaces, fought for lower prices of antiretroviral drugs. Even stronger in 
influencing GHG in this regard have been legal interfaces which often worked in conjunction 
with their discursive counterparts.  
For a long time, pharmaceutical patents and the rights WTO member states posses vis-à-vis 
pharmaceutical MNCs under the TRIPS Agreement have been highly contentious issues. With 
its threat of compulsory licensing generic drugs, the Brazilian government has exerted pres-
sure on pharmaceutical MNCs36 and has resisted pressure from governments of developed 
countries such as the United States. In the same vain, the court case, which the pharmaceutical 
industry filed against South Africa’s 1997 Medicines and Related Substances Control 
Amendment Act exerted influence on GHG. It augmented the government’s discursive case 
for lower prices of ARV treatment and – on a more general level – of fairness between the 
developing and developed countries under the TRIPS Agreement. On the topic of prices for 
ARVs there has thus been the biggest coherence between Brazil and South Africa. By using 
discursive and legal interfaces both governments have pursued confrontational strategies 
against MNCs in order to influence GHG.  
On the whole, besides using legal and discursive interfaces in the quest for affordable ARVs, 
Brazil and South Africa have entered into contrasting relationships to GHG. Due to the com-
parably high degree of autonomy of both Brazil and South Africa, the fundamental determi-
nants for conflict and cooperation with GHG can predominately be found in the realms of the 
state. Central actors such as the South African government can cause a conflictive relationship 
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ties and the industrial capacities to produce generic drugs. The same holds true for South Africa.  
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to GHG and can limit its influence. In Brazil, this dominating actor with a negative predispo-
sition towards HIV/AIDS treatment and national-global interaction in this area has been ab-
sent.  
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